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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ROBERT E. )fANNING,
Plantiff and Appellant;

Case No. 7276

vs.
JAMES l\1. POWERS,

RE S.PONDENT'S BRIEF
1

OPENING STATEMENT

Appellant's opening statement in the form of ''Ques-.
tions Presented" is so obviously calculated to incite
pre-judice and sympathy as to suggest an effort to confuse the evidence .and issues. We cannot accept the conclusions of eo~_sel as fact or as an;y evidence of the facts.
Appellant's comment that "defendant's testimony is
disproven not only by the physical facts, but by all eye
witness·es to the accident'' is as unfounded as the false
theory that counsel attempted· to put over to the jury,
namely: that defendant ran deceased down by striking;
the rear of th·~ bicycle as it was headed down the street
in a general southerly direction.
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The jury after hearing all the evidence saw the fallacy of appellant's theory and returned_ a unanimous
verdict of no cause of action. Therefore, this court is not
requir-ed to take that view of the evidence- which is most
favorable to appellant (which appellant takes for
granted) because if the verdict is sustained by the evidence, the judgment should be affirmed.
B-ecause of the distorted picture painted by counsel,
we have hereafter summarized the testimony of each
witness and physical evidence, which proves the inconsistency of plaintiff's claims.
No Dispute as to th-e Course of Trav~el of the Bicycle·
Before It Suddeny Turned

There was no dispute in the pleadings or the evidence that the Manning boy just prior to the accident
was traveling south in the west ~edge of the pavement
or a. few inches on the shoulder. Plaintiff so alleged
a~d P.~~V,ed. ·( Tr. 1).
Sole Disputed· Fact

The sole dispute arose by reason of plaintiff's allegations that defendant was 'travling south in the mo-st
w>esterly lane and ran down the boy, striking the rear
fender of the bicycle- W:ith the right front of his car,
whereas defendant" contends' he, defendant, was traveling
in the Zooe' of t·ra4fic' next. to the oenter ·of the highW'OI!J,
and that the .Manning. boy s:uddenly and without any
warning ·or ·signal turned direct~y into the right front
fender of defendant's car.
2
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As the sole basis for proving his contention, counsel
for plaintiff at the trial produced the bicycle, which had
a dent in the rear fender and which counsel claimed
could only have been caused by contact with the front
of defendant's car. All the physical evidence demonstrates the fallacy of that theory.
FACTS AND EVIDENCE

The accident occured October 6, 1947, a few minutes
after 8 :40 . A.. ~f. on Second West Street between Sixth
and Seventh South Streets in Salt Lake City. It was
clear and dry, ~s.econd West being a paved four lane
through or arterial highway with wide gravel shoulders.
The regulated speed was 35 m.p.h. (Tr. 205-6). There
was a traffic light at 6th South; then none until 9th
South. There was no one on the street other than defendant and Robert Manning.
D~efendant's

Testimony

Defendant, James W. Powers, a salesman residing
at Brigham City, Utah, testified he wa.s driving his 1946
Nash sedan south on Second West. He had stop1ped for
the red light at Sixth South (Tr. 214); then proceeded
south in the lane of traffic next west of the center line
(Tr. 214). As he proceeded south, he observed the Manning boy coming out from the west side of the street
(from one of the driveways about in the middle of the
block) (Tr. 324) and watched him turn south ahead of
him on Second West, the boy heading south on his bicycle
along the extreme west edge of the concrete, possibly six
inches onto the shoulder or possibly six inches on the con3
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crete ( Tr. 216.) \\rhen he, Manning, ca1ne out of the drive ..
way, he turned onto the highway, making the usual curve
and continuing in a southerly direction along the edge of
the highway. As he did so, he, defendant, was approximately 60 or 70 feet back of the boy (Tr. 325). They
both proceeded directly south in a parallel. direction
(there being one lane for traffic between them), the car
moving ahead a little faster than the bicycle. When defendant's car was nearly parallel with the bicycle, or
possibly thelength of the car behind (Tr. 216), the Manning boy suddenly and without warning turned abruptly
toward the east side of the street and into the right front
of defendant's car (Tr. 215-17). The front wheel of the
bicycle struck the front fender of the car (Tr. 216). To
avoid the accident, defendant himself turned toward the
east and applied his brakes ( Tr. 216). After the impact,
he momentarily released his brakes to keep' out of the
way of northbound traffic, and stopped east of the paved
portion on Second West ( Tr. 216). He testified deceased
gave no signal and he, defendant, saw no reason for
the boy making a turn until he commenced to turn. The
bicycle was at no time in front of defendant's car (Tr.
216). Defendant estimated his own speed at twenty-five
to thirty miles per hour. It was a thirty-five mile zone.
Physical Evidence

As appellant claims defendant's testimony is disproven by the physical facts, and as most of the witnesses
testified with refeTence to the map, we have inserted
herein a copy of the relevant portion of the map, Plaintiff's Exhibit A (the original, but not the inserted map
4
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being to the scale of one inch equals ten feet). During
the final part of the trial, it was necessary for defendant
to recall Mr. Tipton, the engineer who prepared the map,
to explain that it showed only one-half or approximately
320 feet of the sDuth one-half of the block, showing Seventh South, but not Sixth South (Tr. 338-40).
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Polnt of Impact
The lanes for traffic were ten feet in width (Tr. 248).
The investigating officers determined the point of impact as being at the spot marked "X", being 12 feet east
fronl the west edge of the ptavement and 143 feet north
of the north curb on Seventh South. At that point, ''there
was a real small black mark indicating rubber or something sliding along the pavement for maybe six inches;
and then a series of scratches and digs in the pavement
leading off to the side of the road (Tr. 248-9, 132).
Tire Marks

The tire marks made by defendant's car commenced
in the middle .of the lane of traffic next t;o the center line,
30 feet south of the P'oint of imp1act .or point marked u X"
on the diagram (Tr. 252, 132). Officer 'S,parks explained
that in drawing the tire marks on the diagram and in
his original notes, he had not drawn them to scale, hut
they were free hand (Tr. 262-3). It should be observed,
therefore, that according to the scale of the map, the tire
marks would have shown up in the middle of the lane of
traffic next west of the center line three inches south.
of the point of impact, marked ''X'', which would be one
and a half to two inches north from where_ he actually
placed them on the diagram, plaintiff's exhibit A.
Marks on Car and Bicycle

The pictures, Plaintiff's Exhibit C and D, show the
small dent just to th·e right of the right headlight where
the front fender of the bicycle scraped the car, and both
pictures show the large dent in the side on the right front

7
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door and the marks and scratches toward and in the running board (Tr. 256-7). Exhibit C shows a bend in the
lower part of the rear fender. There was also "dustdisturbed on the right front fender running back toward
the back end of the fender (Tr. 257). In addition to the
large dent on the right front door, the door handle was
bent into an upward position (Tr. 257). See Exhibit D.
The bicycle, Plaintiff's Exhibit B, had two substantial dents, one on the left side of the front fender, which
had been bent in against the front wheel, that is, into the
tire to such extent that it was necessary for O·fficer
Sparks to pull the fender out back into position so the
"rheel would turn ( Tr. 358). The same fender had also
been torn loose from its attachment on the frame (Tr.
257). See the ~picture; Defendant's Exhibit 3. The other
1nark was the indentation or crease on the. hark of thP
rear fender hereinafter mentioned.
Position of Body and Bicycle

The boy was lying in the center of the west lane and
the bicycle just north of him, substantially as illustrated
on the diagram, except his head was pointing in a northwesterly direction, his head being six feet from the west
edge of the pavement ( Tr. 250, 200) and thirty-five feet
south from the point of impact (Tr. 251). Exhibit 4
shows blood stains where the blood ran toward the west
(Tr. 351-2). An "X" was marked on that exhibit by
Officer Sparks showing where the head was lying on the
pavem.ent. Manning's lunch which he had held in his
right hand was scattered along- the edge of the road
(Tr. 269-71).

8
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These undispute·d physical facts establish the position of def~ndant's automobile as being in the lan·e of
traffic next to the center line and indicate the manner in
which the bicycle and rider, after striking the front fender on an angle, came into contact with the side of the
car. The large dent and the damaged door handle are
the only explanation of how deceased met his death, by
reason of the skull fracture and depression in the rear of
deceased's head, described by Dr. Jack Cox as being the
most probable caus·e of instantaneous death. (Tr. 121).
Plaintiff's Claim

In offering the bicycle as an exhibit (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2), counsel pointed out the dent in the rear fender claimed to be th·e point of impact as between the
right front fender of defendant's car and the bicycle. To
so presume, however, ignores the d·ent on th·e left side of
the front fender ( S·ee the bicycle, Plaintiff's Exhibits
and the picture. Defendant's Exhibit 3), obviously made
when it first came in contact with the car, sliding along
the right side of the car. Viewmg ~all the evidence: it is
clear trhe d~agonal c.reas~e iln the rear fe11J.der of the bicycle
covuld wot have been oOJUsed by the mark or defnt ju.st t.o
the rig'ht ~of the right headlight of defendamt's ca·r. Nor
is appellant's claim that the-re was some slight red paint
brushed into the dent any proof when both the car and
bicycle were painted red. n order to believe appellant's
theory, one would have to ignore all th·e physical facts
and further indulge in the wildest kind of speculation as
to how the dent in the fender of defendant's car could
9
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hav-e raused the angular dent in the rear fender of the
bicycle.
Plaintiff's Witnesses

The only witnesses called by plaintiff were illrich
Stark, an elderly farme~ from Freedom, Sanpete County,
\vho had not disclosed his pres.ence, nor given his name
to the investigating officers at the time of the accident
( Tr. 186) and LeRoy Iverson, one of the three investigating officers, who was only called in an effort to prove
speed based on tire marks.
Ulrich Stark

Ulrich Stark, visiting here for October Conference
(Tr. 176), said that he was walking casually south on the
east sidewalk between Sixth and Seventh South (Tr. 177)
standing ·east of the light pole at the place marked 2 on
the map (Tr. 188). He testified to having seen the Manning boy riding his bicycle south on the west side of the
street next to the pav·ernent (Tr. 1'78). In first describing
the accident, he testified:
'' Q.

A.

At that time, what did you see about an automobile on that street~
Well, the boy was ahead and the auto1nobile
carne right behind it, and the first t.hing I
know, the boy W'as laying down on the parPrnent." (Tr. 179)

Immediately thereafter, while co·unsel by leadirig got the
witness· to conclude that the automobile was in the west
lane and· corning along behind struck the bicycl.e ( Tr~ 79)
that testimony· was entirely negatived by the later testi-
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mony coming out on both direct and cross examination.
We quote:
On direct exrunination :

''Q.

What was the thing that first attracted your
attention to the accident~

A.

\Vell, I was coming down the road and this
bike here, then the automobile, then I he1ard
the screech of the ca.r, and the c'nash." ( Tr.
184)

On cross examination :

''Q. Did you have a clear view of the boy on the
bicycle just before the accident occured ~
A.

No. I just seen him, that was all. It was done

so quick I didn't know which was which.

Q.

You had ·a clear view of hiim, ~and yovu did!n'.t
see him ag,ain until you s1aw him latying :on
the paveme{YI)t?

A.

That is right.

Q. Did yovu see either he or the b1icycle movin,g
on the pta.vement, after you s~aw him ridifng it.
A.

No sir.

Q. When you observed the boy, did you observe
whether or not he was carrying anything in
either hand as he rode the bicycle~
A.

I never noticed at all." (Tr. 187)

It is easy to appreciate that from where elderly Mr.
Stark was walking, having no idea an accident would
occur, he could not place the exact respective positions
of the bicycle and car. His testimony insofar as it tends

11
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to prove plaintiff's theory is certainly refuted by the
physical facts and his own admissions on cross examination, confirming his original statement that he saw
the boy on the bicycle but ( (didn't see him again until he
w~as lying on the p~avement.. ''
Stark's testimony could not he considered any
strongeT than as shown on cross examination. Porter v.
Hunter, 60 Utah 222, 207 Pac. 153; E·dw~ards v. OZark,
96 Utah 121, 83 Pac. ( 2d) 1021.
Office·r Iverson

Leroy ~ verson said he was assisted in his investigation by Officers Atkins and Sparks (Tr. 125). He described the dent in the right fender and door and the
brush marks along the door as shown in the pictures
(Plaintiff's Exhibits C and D) (Tr. 126). He identified
the bicycle pointing out the dent in the front and rear
fenders (TT. 129), and placed the position of the body as
drawn on the diagram (Tr. 130).
In connection with the tire marks, he described them
as heading in a southeasterly direction ''on an arch-way,
arced." (TT. 130.) At the beginning they were very
szright. As they went on toward the southeast they darkened up. Ther·e was some debris in the street one hundred forty-three feet north of Seventh South and thirty
feet north of the north end of the tire marks. The actual
tire marks started about thirty feet south of the debris,
running eighty-three feet on the pavement and thirty
feet into the gravel (Tr. 132).
12
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vVhen asked his opinion as to speed before answering on voir dire, Offic.er Iverson testified there were only
t\v·o tire marks at the beginning or north ·end; that four
tire marks con1menced sixty feet beyond or near the
east edge of the pavement (S·ee map) (Tr. 137). From
where the four tire marks commenced, the marks were
black and deep into the gravel leading up to the r;ear of
defendant's car (Tr. 137-8). The light tire marks indicated the brakes had not been fully applied until near
the eilge of the pavement (sixty feet from the point of
con1mencement) (Tr. 137-8). So that at least two wheels
had not been causing any friction for the first sixty
feet (Tr. 138). The tire marks wer-e of different widths
(Tr. 138). The solid brake or tire marks extended thirty
feet in the gravel (T·r. 139). The fact that defendant's
car \Vas turning or skidding would have a bearing on his,
Iverson's calculation of speed (Tr. 141), and the fact
that the car was turning or skidding would itself cause
some visible imprint depending on the speed (Tr. 141).
In his experience, he, Officer Iverson, had made no actual
tests where the car was turning as defendant's car was
turning (Tr, 142). With this uncertain background and
over defendant's objection that the circumstances werie
not proved with any certainty, and that the witness was
not qualified in view of the speculative ·evidence ( Tr.
144), he attempted to place defendant's speed at forty
to forty-five miles per· hour (Tr. 144). That he did not
understand the engineering formula for calculating
speed is evident when he held up the trial being wholly
unable to explain the formula or figur:es (Tr. 151-2). ~s.
13
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S. Taylor, a qualified engineer, later, explained why.
As to the scene of the accident, Iverson identified
the pictures (Defendant's Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4) as representing the scene of the accident existing when the
accident occured (Tr. 146).
Defendant's Exhibit 1 shows on the right side of the
picture, the rear end of defendant's car where it stopped;
also the brake marks from the rear of the car to where
they left the pavement. The marks did not show up v:ery
well on the pavement (Tr. 146-8). (See Spark's testiInony to the same effect Tr. 265).
Defendant's Exhibit 2 shows Second West looking
south. In the picture, Iverson testified that the ordinary
tire marks in the picture (wot caused by deferu]G!I1Jt's c1ar)
show up rather clearly and do not indicate speed on the
part of the vehicle involved ( Tr. 149-50). While other
marks were readily observable in the pictures, it is significant that in none of the pictures r·eferred to (D·efendant's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3) are tire marks from defendant's car visible with any degree of certainty. The only
ones definitely shown are in the gravel on Defendant's
Exhibit 1, directly back of defendant's car (Tr. 149-50).
Manning Boy

Plaintiff offered evidence that the Manning boy was
eleven years of age, in the sixth grade, bright and above
average intelligence ('Tr. 155). He was a m.ember of
and a sergeant in the junior traffic boys or junior service
organization at school. Only the most dep.endable and
reliable boys were selected for this work, which required
1~
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~fanning

before school hours to go from corner to corner to check the other traffic boys located at four designated intersections to see that they were present and performing their duties. Robert used his bicycle in doing
this 'York (Tr. 153). He was assigned to check the corners west of West Temple 'Street, including the intersection at Seventh South and Second West ( Tr. 154). School
started at 9 :00 a.m. (Tr. 155). At school he had been
taught safety rules and instructed by demonstrations and
an illustrated movie film "Bicycling with Safety"· on
all the rules of riding a bicycle, the proper way to signal, the proper side of the street, and other traffic rules
and regulations (Tr. 156). He was familiar and well
versed in those rules ( Tr. 156).
'
At the time of the accident, there were four friends
or school chums of Robert Manning on or near the northeast corner of the intersection. Raymond Hubbard and
Tommie Monahan, members of the school traffic patrol,
had been patrolling the traffic on the north side of the
intersection and were expecting Robert Manning that
morning to check them at the intersection before continuing on to school. Eddie Monahan was with these boys.
Just before the accident occurred, the fourth boy, Robert
or Bobbie Barnett, seeing Robert Manning riding south
on the west edge of the highway (at the place marked
O.B. on the map in front of Jensen Tire Co.) shouted:
"Here comes Bob" and/or "Well, if it isn't Manning."
(Tr. 119, 289). At that instant the Manning boy suddenly
turned toward_ the east across the highway toward his
friends coming into collision with defendant's c3:r.
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At the trial, plaintiff's counsel did not call any of
these boys to tell the facts of the accident, except to
permit Eddie Monahan to describe the position of the
bicycle after the accident occurred ( Tr. 112), and that
he thereafter moved the bicycle leaning it against a
parked car and later riding it to the Manning residence
(Tr. 113-14), objecting to high heaven when an effort
was made to cross examine the witness about the accident
and the fact that he was expecting to meet deceased that
morning. The court did finally permit him to testify
as to his position on the north sidewalk of ;S:eventh South
on the northeast corner just south of the service station
where he marked it OE (Tr. 117) with Raymond Hubbard
(Tr. 118), and Tommie Monahan (his brother) (Tr. 1189).
~

In addition to defendant himself, defendant called
O·fficers Atkins and Sparks, the two investigation officers, the four boy friends of Robert Manning, who w·ere
standing on or near the northeast corner of the intersection, and S. S. Taylor, an exp~ert on speed.
Investigating Officers

Officers Atkins and Sparks explained that they got
to the scene of the accident within four minutes after
receiving the radio call ( Tr. 198), and upon arrival, seeing the boy had not survived, commenced to make the
usual fatality investigation, making a special effort to get
full and complete statements from all witness·es and all
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possible physical evidence, using a steel tape for accuracy (Tr. 200-1).
Officer Atkins proceeded to get the names of witnesses and get statements, including those of Bobbie Barnett and Eddie Monahan, who sat in the back of his car
(Tr. 201, 205·), while Officer Sparks investigated the physical evidence (Tr. 248).
W. S. Sparks

Sparks in addition to testifying to the physical evidence hereinabove outlined, further ·e.xplained that the
tire marks ''were very light marks, to start out with.
You could hardly se·e them on the pavement. Had to
get the light just (Tr. 252) right on them to see them,
and they went in a circular direction toward the southeast, and as they continued on they got heavier. The1e
were only two (marks) to start out with, and they
changed to four just before ~hey got off the concrete.''
The over-all length was 83 feet to the rear wheels of
the car. The four wheel marks." started just before the
car got off the concrete. They were 31 feet long.'' He
illustrated the marks by drawing them on the diagram
(Plaintiff's Exhibit A) (Tr. 253). He ~explained there
was a difference bHtween a brake mark that is laid down
when the brake is locked and a tire mark that is made
when a car (wheels) is turning. When a brake is locked,
the marks it leaves on the surface are very heavy and
black ; and when a car is turning they are not near
as wide, and they are not near as black or as easy to
see. He didn't desigwa~te all83 fe.et as tire m1arks. He did
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designate about 32 feet of them as such (Tr. 254), only
part of the 32 feet being on thH pavement (Tr. 255).
During his investigation, he tested defendant's car
to get the maximum power out of it, and see if the brakes
were good (Tr. 256). He dro¥e it hack to Sixth South
and running it south on the highway, giving it all the
power it had to get it up to forty miles per hour. At a
point approximately 50 to 75 feet north of the point of
impact he applied the brakes hard and stopped in 58 feet
of real black, heavy tire marks on four whe~els. In testing the car, he started out in low, got it up to about
twenty miles per hour, then shifted into second and gave
it all the gas it had. (Tr. 256).
S. S. Taylor

Mr. Taylor, a qualified expert on traffic engineering,
including the analysis of accidents and determining of
speeds of vehicles based on braking distanees (Tr. 326-7),
explained the various formulas were used in computing
speed ( Tr. 327 -8). He said that where the marks laid
down 'vere not of such a nature as to evidence a con tinuous locking or sliding of the tire, it would be impossible
to determine speed based on any of the given forrnulas
'' "\vithout testing the particular car involved and first
ascertaining the percent,age of b·1iaking first applied."
(Tr. 330). From the formulas ordinarily used, and in particular of the one used by Officer Iverson, with only 31
feet of ·definite brake marks, it would be impossible to
accurately calculate the spe~ed of defendant's car from
the physical evidence. (Tr. 330-1-2). He further explained
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that in Inaking a turn the car would leave visible tire
marks W'"hich could be seen and photographed even though
the brakes may not have been applied or only partially
applied. ( Tr. 331-2). He further exp~lained reaction time
and that the average reaction time was about 3;4 of a
second ( Tr. 334).
Raymond Hubbard

Raymond said he was eleven years, In the sixth
grade, and resided at 339 West 6th South (Tr. 286-7).
He had lmo,vn Robert Thianning during all of their school
years. He "Tas on the traffic patrol, servicing the intersection mentioned (Tr. 287). Robert Manning regularly
checked the corner every morning, but had not as yet
checked this particular day. Just before the accident,
he ''Tas walking to school with Eddie and Tommie 1Ionahan at the point marked OR on the diagram (being on
the north sidewalk of S·eventh :South Street just east of
the intersection) (Tr. 288) .. He said: "The only thing
that attracted my attention to it was when Bobbie· Barnett called to him.'' Bobbie Barnett was on his bicycle at
the point designated OB, just west of the Jensen Tire
Company on the east side of Second West Street. Bobbie
called, ''Well if it isn't Manning,'' and just then Eddie
Monahan ran over to the corner (Tr. 289). He turned
around and talked to say somthing to Tommie, but he
saw the bicycle and car come together. He had first seen
the defendant's car up the street about opposite the figure 2 (which was a short distance north of the point
of impact). He thought the car was about in the middle
of the two lanes, referring to the two west lanes.
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"Q.

What did Bobbie do as the car approached
Robert Manning~

Well, he turned out to miss those two cars, o.r
he was going t~o come over to us, but he
turned out in front of the car.
Q. Did you s.ee him turn out~
A. Yes. (Tr. 290).
Q. Did you observe whether or not he made any
_ kind of signal before he turned~
A. I don't think he did.''
He saw the bicycle and car come together, but he was
not sure what part of the bicycle struck what part of the
car. Bobbie Manning was carrying his lunch in his right
hand. After the accident, Eddie ran over to where the
body was lying. He and Tommie later left for school.
When Bobbie Barnett called, "If it isn't Manning" the
accident had not then occurred. That was before the
accident occur:r;ed (Tr. 291-2).
On cross-examination, he stated he wasn't paying
much attention to the automobile. Whether it was in the
center of one or the center of another of the particular
lanes of traffic, he didn't pretend to state. He was looking more ca~efully at the Manning boy (Tr. 292). He
had expected Robert Manning to check him that morning
before school (Tr. 293). Before Robert M·anning turned,
he was headed due south. When he turned, he went in a
southeast dire-ction (Tr. 294).
Tommi~e Monahan
Tommie was Eddie's brother and was in the sixth
grade, r-esiding at 335 West 6th South (Tr. 311). He
was standing with Raymond Hubbard and Eddie MonaA.
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han. The first thing that attracted his attention to Robert l\Ianning ·u'as Bobbi-e Barnett calli;n.g to him. Manning
was just waving a.t Bobbie and then ''started turning.''
Then the car hit him. He could not describe the point of
contact. Before Manning turned, he was going south
(Tr. 312). After he turned he was going southeast, turning over into the direction where they were standing.
''I don't think he signalled, but if he did, I didn't see
him.'' He was watching him until the accident happened.
He didn't see the car until it occurred. He didn't have
any opinion as to the sp·eed of the car, other than "it
was going about as fast as all the other cars along there
go." ( Tr. 313).
On cross examination, he refused to state that the
automobile hit the back of the bicycle. He ·did see Bobbie
Manning riding right along on the shoulder toward the
parked cars on the shoulder ( Tr. 316). ''I just saw him
turn-then there was a crash.'' (Tr. 317). After the accident he didn't see any cars move away from the scene.
The cars that were there just r~emained right there, and
the bicycle was plac.ed leaning against the outstide car.
(Tr. 318).
Robert Barnett

Robert Barnett testified he was riding his bicycle
north on the ·east side of the street at about the point
marked OB on the diagram. He first saw Robert Manning riding his bicycle on the shoulder south on Second
West in front of Ashworth Transfer Company (marked
on the diagram). He was going straight on (Tr. 296,
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299). \Vhen he saw Robert Manning, he ''hollered to
him, 'Oh, no, if it isn't Manning.' (Tr. 2'96). He (Manning) waved at me with his left hand; then put his hand
back on his handlebars.'' He did not see Manning make
any signal. -After the impact he got off his bike and ran
over to Robert, who was lying about in the position shown
on the diagram (Tr. 297). He didn't know how far the
car was on the pavement (Tr. 300). His impression of it
'vas that part of the car was on the outside lane and part
of it was on the inside lan~. Both "kept on going right
along there-until he (Manning) turned out." (Tr. 301).
He did not tell Attorney Willard Hanson (when they
visited the scene of the accident) "that the automobile
was right behind the bicycle.'' What he meamt w1as that
the bicycle was right ~on the edge of the ed:ge of the road
(Tr. 302).
While this witness on cross examination was finally
led to say that the automobile had hit the rear of the
bicycle ( Tr. 307), this was only when this immatur,e witness was confronted with a signed statement obtained by
Attorney Willard Hanson from the boy at his home,
couched in counsel's own language (Tr. 305-'7). When
an effort was made by defendant to show surprise based
on what Robert Barnett had said in his original statement to (he police officers, defendant was prevented from
using the statement by reason of counsel's objections
that it was an effort to impeach defendant's own witness. (Tr. 309-11).
Eddie Monahan

Eddie Monahan, walking wi'th his brother and Ray22
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n1ond Hubbard, sa\Y Robert ~fanning riding south on the
\Ye~t edge of the high\vay-\Yest edge of the concrete.
He heard Bobbie holler to hin1 and saw Bobbie Manning
turn \Y·ithout signalling and tne car and bicycle con1ing
together. He had no opinion as to the speed of the car
(Tr. 278-9). He thought the car was traveling bet\v·een
the two \vest lanes of traffic just before the accident ( Tr.
281). \Vnen he sa\v the car and bicycle, the car was a
little ahead of the bike. The bike was west of the automobile. They weren't very close. He "knew Bobbie
turned,'' but he didn't know whereabouts in there."
(Tr. 284).
QUESTI•ONS FOR REVIEW

Appellant has made six assignments of error which
can be divided into two groups, namely:
1. Is the verdict supported by the evidence~
2. Was there prejudicial error in the instructions to
the juryT
ARGUMENT
APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR· NO. I

THE VERDICT WAS MORE THAN SUSTAINED
BY THE EVIDENCE
While most of the eye witnesses were boys, friends
of deceased, th·ere is no real or substantial inconsistency
with their testimony and the testimony of defendant.
Inasmuch as plaintiff did not call these boys as witnesses,
defendant was obligated, or at least justified in so doing,
although he was thereby precluded from showing their
original statements as given to the investigating officers
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j ns t after the accident occurred. Practically the only
variance in their testimony as compared with that of
defendant was that they placed defendant's car as being
straddle the two lanes of traffic. Howev.er, the physical
facts establish defendant's position in the lane of traffic
next to the center of the highway. The boys were not
certain as to the exact position of the car and from
where they were could not too accurately judge.
We have reviewed the testimony of all the witnesses
and called particular attention to the p1hysical evidenc·e
to show that appellant's claim that the v.erdict is not
sustained by the evidence is not well taken. Rather the
physical evidence viewed in the light of all the testimony
corroborates defendant's version and establishes the
proximate cause of the accident as being the negligence
of Robert Manning in suddenly turning from a direct
course on· the edge of the pavement or shoulder across a
lane of t.'J1affic and imm·ediately into defendant's right
front fender. The evidence not only sustains the verdict,
but no other conclusion is reasonable under all of the
evidence.
In R'ichards v. Balace L(JfiJ!Ybdry, 55 Utah 409, 186
Pac. 439, plaintiff was riding a bicycle north on State
Street. To keep out of the way of an automobile coming
fron1 behind, plaintiff turned his bicycle to the west and
in so doing, one of the bicycle wheels went into a depression or ''groove'' in the rail of a street car track,
causing the bicycle to fall, plaintiff falling on the west
Ride of the highway about twenty or thirty feet in front
24
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of defendant's truck approaching from the north at nine
to fifteen Iniles per hour. Plaintiff's foot was crushed by
the truck. The court held there was no evidence- that the
driver of defendant's truck saw plaintiff fall in front of
the truck in tiine t.o have stopped before passing over
his foot. .A. non-suit ''Tas sustained on appeal.
See also Ka.1ca.gu.chi v. Bennett, ______ Utah ------, 189
Pac. (2d) 109, "\Yhere a school child was unexp·ectedly
pushed in front of defendant's bus and there was insufficient time to avoid the accident. A v·erdict of no cause
of action \Ya.s sustained.
Where the jury finds the issues in favor of defendant, that view of the evidence must be resolved which is
most favo-rable to defendant, that is, the view which sustains the verdict.
Carter t:. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238
Pac. 259;
Flinders v. Hwnter, 60 Utah 314, 208 Pac. 526;
Harris v. Ogden St. La. Co., 39 Utah 436, 117 Pac.
700·

'

A.ngerman Co. v. Edgerm.an, 76 Utah 394, 290 Pac.
169·
3 Am. J' ur. Sec. 888, page 44; Sec. 889, page 448 ;
·S.ec. 901, page 468; Sec. 903, page 472.
APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT IQ·F ERROR NiO·. II

THE COURT DID NOT OVER-EMPHASIZE THE
DEFENSE OF CONTRIBUTO·RY NEGLIGENCE,
BUT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON
THE RESPECTIVE STATUTORY AND C·OMMON
I-'AW DUTIES OF BOTH PARTIES.
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Appellant's criticism of the court's instructions is
not justified in that he singles out isolated parts of the
instructions without r'eviewing them as a whole, and without any consideration of the issues defined by the pleadings and several statutory provisions involved.
Both parties allege several grounds of negligence
and contributory negligence, each of which was denied
by the other. It was, therefoe, incumbent upon the court
to instruct the jury on each specific claim, defining the
la'v and the duties of each, leaving the issues of fact
to be determined by the jury. The only instructions in
'vhich contributory negligence was covered, other than
in a general sense, were instructions Nos. 12 to 16
inclusive, or five instructions (Tr. 354-7).
Of these, the court's instruction No. 12 (Tr. 63, 3545) instructed the jury with respect to the statutory law
or duty defined under Sect~on 57-7-133, (a), prohibiting
the turning of a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway unless and until such movement could be made with
reasonable safety.
The court's instruction No. 13 (Tr. 64, 355) explained the statutory law with respect to making a signal
before turning in the manner defined under Sect,ion 57-7135 (1), by -extending the hand horizontally for a distance
of one hundred feet, as further defined under Section
57-7-133.
By instruction No. 14 (Tr. 65, 356), the court instructed the jury on the provisions of S;ection 57-7-128,
1

26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

relating to the necessity of keeping entirely within a
single lane unless movement therefrom could be n1ade
with reasonable safety.
By the court's instruction No. 15 (Tr. 356), the court

instructed the jury as to plaintiff's duty in keeping a
proper lookout, 'vhich duty is well established by this
court.
Bullock -v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 Pac. (2d) 350;
Sine v. S. L. Tra;nsport,atlion C.o., 106 Utah 289,
147 Pac. (2d) 875;
Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 Pac. (2d) 680.
The court's instruction No. 16 (Tr. 357) instructed
the jury that if the plaintiff, Robert Manning, "negligently drove his bicycle from a place of safety into the
side of defendant's automobile, and that such act, if any,
proximately contributed in any degree to cause the collision, the plaintiff could not recover." It is well established law that one can be negligent in car~elessly moving
from a place of safety into a place of danger, and it was
proper to so instruct the jury.

S,ection 57-7-148 makes bicycles subject to the motor
vehicle act.
While plaintiff complains of the court's instruction
No. 17 (Tr. 357), that instruction did not relate to contributory negligence, but to the duty of plaintiff and his
freedJom from negligence if he w:as in exercise of reasonable oare.
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QUALIFYING INSTRU·CTIONS

Each of the instructions given on contributory negligence were qualified by the court's instruction No. 3,
defining "negligence", "contributory negligence", "ordinary care" and "proximate cause", (Tr. 348-9) "ordinary care'' h~ing defined as follows :
'' 'Ordinary care' is that degree of care
which a reasonably prudent person would use
under the same or similar circumstances. 'Ordinary care' implies the exercise of reasonable
diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight as 1JJYIJder ·all the ci~rcumst~ances of the particular case would be exercised by a reasonably
careful, prudent person;''
Each instruction was further qualified by the court's
instruction No. 4 (Tr. 349):
''That said Robert Manning was under a
duty to exercise that degree of care for his own
safety which would ordinarily be used by an or.,
dinarily prudent boy of the same age, capacity
and ·experience.''
Said instruction further told the jury that they were to
presu1ne deceased "ras in the exercise of due care unless
there "\vas actual proof to the contrary.
The jury was further instructed that the instructions though numbered seperately were:
''to be considered and construed by you as
one connected whole. Each instruction should be
read and understood with reference to and as a
part of the entire charge and not as though one
in·struction separately was intended to present
28
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the \Yhole la\Y of the case upon any particular
point," etc. ( Tr. 361-2).
By instruction K o. 2 ( Tr. :~-±7), the jury \Va8 told that
defendant had the burden of proYing contributor~· negligence.
DUTY OF 'THE COURT rro INSTR. UC1, ON ALL
ISSUES

It is \Yell-established la\Y that defendant is entitled
to have the case subn1itted to the jury on any theory
justified by defendant's evidence, as well as upon the
theory of the whole evidence, and failure to instruct
the jury on a Inaterial issue would affect defendant's
substantial rights.
Morgarn v. Bingham St.age Ditnes Co., 75 Utah 87,
283 Pac. 160;

Bartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 Pac.
522;
Pratt v. Uta.h Light & T.r. Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 Pac.
868;
Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 Pac. 893.
See also Reid's B~ans1on Instructi.ons to Ju.ri.es,
3rd Ed. lr ol1, Sec. 52, Page i55, where the author states:

"It is the duty of the court to submit all such
issues, both affirmative and negative.''
And at page 157 :
''It is not enough to give the theory of one
of the parties, both in the affirmative and the
negative, but the court should also give the theory
of the other party. The affirmative charge should
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he given though a general charge may have been
given to the same effect.''
See also Vol. 1 Btashfi.eld' s Instructions to Juries,
2nd Ed., pa.ges 218-9:
''Instructions to the jury should not ignore
any of the issues, theories or defenses. * * *
Whether the court believes ·the evidence or not,
the issues must be presented to the jury."
The duty of the court to instruct on all issues is
especially important where the alleged claim of negligenee or contributory negligence is expr~essly denied by
the opposing pa.rty. See Smith v. Columbus Buggy C·o.,
40 Utah 580, 123 Pac. 580.
To Combline Instructions May Be Error
Whil·e it may ~·e possible to give correct instructions
h~~ combining so1ne of them, some discretion is given to
the trial· court as to the form of the instructions given,
con1bining the instructions has sometimes lead to confusion and is error.

In Leete v. Hayes, (Iowa), 233 N. W. 481, where
several g!f"lownds of negligence were ·alleged, and den~ed
by the opp1osing P'arty, it w~as held errOtr to growp the
se;p1ar;ate cl.aims of sep~ar.ate and distinct acts of negligence int:o one instruction.
See also Reid.'s Bro;nson lnst.ructions t;o Juries, 3rd
Ed. 17 ol. 1, at page 248:
"While it is the duty of the court to give
instructions declaring the law applicable to all
phases of the case, it is discretionary with the
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judge whether or not to elaborate upon instructions given that do fairly cover the case. Each
instruction should be complete, though it is not
required to contain all the law applicable to the
case. * * * "\Vhere several i te1ns of negligence are
charged against the defendant in an automobile
accident case, they should be set forth in s~evparrajte
instrncti.on.._~, and it is error to group th~em. ''
At page 246:
''Great importance is not attached to the
matter of form of instructions provided they are
germane to the issues and are correct statements
of the law."
At page 249:
''There is no Med rule as to the order of
the instructions. This matter is at the choiee of
the court. ' '
In Smith v. Columbus Buggy Com.p~arn.lJ, supra, at
pages 596-7 of the Utah report, this court pointed out
that the trial judge has some discretion as to the form
of instructions, and there is no error simply becauS:e they
are not in the precise form requested or desired by counsel.
CO-EQUAL

INSTRU~CTIONS

GIVEN ON DEFENDANT'S
ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE

The court did not over emphasize contributory negligence as compared to the instructions given on defendant's alleged negligence. By reciprocal instructions, the
court instructed the jury upon the specific duties of defendant, in each instance stating that defendant vvas
liable if they found him negligent. By the court's in-
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struction No. 1, the fove specifioally alteg.ed C'Zakims of
negligence were stated (Tr. 343-6), and by the court's
instructions Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 ( Tr. 350-3) the court
defined each separate duty of def·endant and told the
jury that defendant was liable for such negligence if
they found him guilty of any one of the claimed alleged
violations.
The court's instruction N·o. 5 (Tr. 350) referred to
all the alleged acts of negligence.
Instruction No. 6 ( Tr. 350) extensively covered defendant's duties as to speed.
Instruction No. 7 ( Tr. 351) specifically covered defendant's statutory duties in passing another vehicle.
Instruction No. 8 (Tr. 352) covered defendant's
duties in passing, and in addition thereto his duties respecting sounding the horn or signalling in passing.
Instruction No.9 (Tr. 353) defined defendant's duty
regarding lookout.
In each of these instructions, the jury was instructed
that a violation of one of these duties by defendant was
negligence, and that if such negligence was the proxirnate cause, in the absence of contributory neglig·ence,
def.endan t was liable.
From the foregoing, it is seen that the court instructed mutually on the respective duties of each of
the parties. There was no particular emphasis on the
def.ense of contributory negligence as against or compared to the claim of negligence of defendant.
32
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. .-\.t page 340, l"'" olume 1, Blashfield-'s Instructions to
J·u.ries, 2nd Edlif'ion, Section 1±7, the author says:

"If the substance of the evidence for both
parties is fairly and impartially stated, one party
cannot complain that the evidence of his adversary is rnore fully or pron1inently stated than his
0\\Tll. ' '

See also Reid's Branson In-struction to Jur-ies,
Ed., r . ol. 1, at page 291 :

~)rd

"The fact that the contentions of one party
·are stated at greater length than tho8e of the
other party does not conclusively show that undue stress is laid upon the contentions of the
other.''
Particularly in view of the instructions given on defendant's negligence, \\-e fail to see or appreciate \Yhere
there \vas any particular emphasis on contributory negligence as compared with the instructions on the negligence of defendant.
APPELLANT'S AUTHORITIES, DISTIN·GUI8HED

In the citation of authorities, appellant fails to consider the distinction between the court's singling out
particular facts or evidence, as distinguished fron1 instructing the jury on the law, as for example, in negligence cases where instructions are given relative to the
legal duties of ·each party. The former is sometirues an
invasion of the province of the jury as constituting conlnlents on the evidence, whereas the latter is the proper
function of the court in instructing the jury on the
law.
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The case of Va.liO'tis v. Utah A1p1ex Minimg Co., 55
Utah 151, 184 Pac. 802, cited at page 11 of Appellant's
Brief, illustrates. In that case a r~quested instruction.
'vhich contained the following language:
''Nor are you to presume or infer any negli. gence on the part of the defendant merely because a round was loose or broken.''
was held to be properly refused in that the request
tended to invade the province of the jury as to the in-ferences of fact to be drawn, and therefore the requested
instruction was properly refused, particularly when the
respective theories of the parties werie fairly covered by
the. instructions given. ;S:ee pages 157-9 of the Utah report.
In Intervnational & G. N. R. Co. v. Newman, (Tex.)
40 S. W. 854, at page 11 of Appellant's Brief, the court
held there was no prejudicial error, affirming a verdict
for plaintiff.
In Cart~e.r v. Miss1ovuri K. & T. R;ailw1ay Co., (·~ex.)
160 S. W. 987, at page 12 of Appellant's Brief, the
repetition in the court's instructions of the definition of
assumption of risk was held not r,eversible error. The
court said that it is accepted doctrine. that such repetitions are not reversible error, particularly
''When the repetitions are .necessary in order
to apply any given rule of law to the various
phases of the case raised by the ·evidence.''
In Wiser v. Cop·el(JJ}1pd;, (Ariz.) 203 Pac. 565, at page·
14 of Appellant's Brief, a pedestrian was hjt by a west34
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bound car. One of defendant's requested instructions
read:
'~You

are instructed that the defendant had
the legal right to drive his vehicle upon any part
of the right of the said McDowell Road, whether
the srune \Yas that part described in evidence as
paved or unpaved, and you ca,nnot find. him guiNy
of negligence Inerely because you may find that
he drove his machine in part upon the unpaved
portion of said road.''

In holding there \Yas not reversible error in refusing
the request, the c.ourt pointed out that negligence n1ust
be determined from all the circumstances, and had the
1nstruction been given:
"The jury might well have concluded that if
the appellant had not been negligent in the driving of his car (in fact, partly upon the unpaved
portion of the road) that the injury would not
have been inflicted. ' '
Considering the instructions of the court taken in
their entirety, there was no particular over en1phasis on
contributory negligence as compared to the instructions
given on defendant's alleged negligence. The specific
instructions given were on issues denied by defenda:n.t
and involved several statutory and co1n1non law duties
on which the court was obligated to instruct. All instructions given were qualified by other explanatory instructions. Counsel acknowledges the correctness of the instructions given and he has no real grounds for coniplaint.
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APPELLANTS ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS.
III AND IV
While appellant has not referred to any transcript
nun1ber under these assignments, it appears counsel
complains that the court did not give his _requested instruction No.6 (Tr. 26) in the exact-form requested. The
request was long and confused and the substance of the
same vvas covered by the court's instruction No. 4 (Tr.
55, 349) and No. 3 ( Tr. 54, 348), wherein the jury qualified the care required of Robert Manning according to
his age, capacity and experience.
It has repeatedly been held that there is no error
in refusing a requested instruction if the substance is
given in another instruction.

1 rimble v. Union P1ac. Stages,
-Pac. (2d) 674;
1

~05

Utah 457, 142

D.avis v. Heifner, 54 Utah 428, 181 Pac. 587;
BergmGJn v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 53 Utah
213 at page 225, 178 Pac. 68;
M:aore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 Pac. (2d) 676;
Brooks v. Ut·ah Hotel Co., 159 Pac. (2d) 127, 108
Utah 220 at page 22:6.
Appellant c-omplains of that part of the court's instruction No. 4 ( Tr. 55, 349) which instructed the jury
that:
''The age, capacity and experience of the
said Robert Manning are factors ·which you may
take into consideration together with all of the
evidence in the case in determining whether or
not the defendant was negligent, so far as such
36
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factors \Yere known to or in the exercise of
ordinary care could have been seen by the~ defendant."
The portion of the instruction con1plained of \va::;
favorable to plaintiff in that in deter1nining \vhether
plaintiff used reasonable and ordinary eare 1Inder all of
the circunzsfa:nces as defined under the court's instruction X o. 3 ( Tr. 5-!, 348), the jury \vas there by advised and
effectively instructed that greater care was required of
defendant "~here children were involved.
APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO·. V
~\s

explained in the preceding paragraph, the jury
having been instructed that defendant was required to
exercise ordinary care under all of the circun1stances,
and in particular having regard to the safety of children, and the court having fully instructed the jury on
several of its instructions em:p1hasi.zing each of the claimed or alleged ·acts of negligence of -d.efenda.nt, the jury
was effectively instructed on the contents and substance
of plaintiff's requested instruction No. 4 ( Tr. 24). Furthermore the instruction as requested was misleading
and improper in that the first sentence reads:
''You are instructed that it is u.ndisputed
that the defendant Powers in driving along and
upon the highway at the time and place in question observed the deceased, Robert 11anning, proceeding along and upon the highway in front of
him upon his bicycle, that he intended to pass hin1
and that he knew at said tim·e that the deceased
was a young boy."
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'Vhile it is undisputed that defendant did see Robert
l\1anning proceeding along the highway, the evidence
'vas that he, Robert Manning, was to the west or side of
the defendant on the edge of the shoulder, with am entire traffic lame separwtfifn.g them, and it would have been
1nisleading and erroneous to instruct the jury to the
exact request, namely: That it was undisputed that
Robert l\fanning was ''proceeding along and upon the
highway in t~ont of him."
APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERR 0'R N:O. VI
1

By this assigned error, appellant complains of the
court's instruction No. 10 (Tr. 61, 353).
By the court's instruction No. 1 (c) ( Tr. 50, 345 ),
and the court's instruction No.8 (Tr. 59, 352), the jury
was instructed on plaintiff's alleged claim of failure to
sound his horn. The first part of No. 8 given at defendant's request read:

''You are instructed that the laws of the
State of Utah require that whenever any person
who is driving or operating an automobile on any
public highway desires to overtake and pass a
vehicle proceeding in front of him, the person
driving the automobile coming from the rear shall
by audible signal indicate his intention to pass
the vehicle proceeding in front of him, thereby
giving to such overtaken driver or rider an opportunity to turn immediately to the right side
of the traveled portion of such highway so as
to allow one-half of the highway to the person
desiring to pass, and to warn the overtaken driver
or rider of the approach of the oncoming vehic1e, and failure to give an audible signal of in38
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tention to pass under such circu1nstances constitutes negligence.'·
The statute inYolYed, Secti.on ;)7-7-:20G(a.), [:tali ('1ode
notated 1943, rea.ds:

~1n

"'Ever)- n1otor vehicle \Yhen operated upon
a high,vay shall be equipped \Yith a horn in good
\vorking order and capable of e1nitting sound
audible under normal conditions froin a distance
of not less than 200 feet, but no horn or other
\Yarning device shall e1nit an unreasonably loud
or harsh sound or a 'vhistle. The driver· of a
Jnotor vehicle shall when reasolfl)ably necessary to
insure safe openation give ·O!Udible warn!itng with
h1i.s hor.n but shall not otherwise use such horn
when upon a highway.''
The court's instruction No. 10 read:
"You are instructed that the law of this state
pertaining to the requirement of sounding a horn
on a motor vehicle does not require the use of a
horn in passing, if the driver of a vehicle intends
to pass another vehicle under any and all circum~
st·atnoes. Therefor.e the question of sounding the
horn is a matter which is left to the sound judgm·ent of the operator of the motor vehicle irn the
exercise .of ordinary care, and the failure to sound
a horn immediately prior to the happening of an
accident does not constitute negligence as a matter of law.''
The court did not say that it was entirely left to
the defendant to determine if it was necessary to sound
the horn, except by so doing he was''li;n the e.rercise of
ordilna.ry care.'' In · other words, if the jury believed
from all of the circumstances, defendant in ·t he exercise
1
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of ordilnary care did not sound the horn, then he was not
negligent in such particular.
In Nels~on v. Lott, 81 Utah 265, 17 Pac. (2d) 272, it
was held error to instruct the jury the defendant was
under an absolute duty to sound the horn.
INSTRUCTIONS

~CONSTRUED

IN ENTIRETY

Referring to instructions to the jury, the court in
Olsen 'V. Oregon 8. L. R. R. C~o., 24 Utah 4-60, 68 Pac.
148, said:
" 'The charge is entitled to a reasonable interpretation. It is construed as a whole, in the
same connected way in which it was given, upon
the presumption that the jury did not overlook
any portion, but gave due weight to it as a whole;
and this is so although it consist of clauses originating with different counsel, and applicable
to different phases of the evidence. If, when so
construed, it presents the law fairly and correctly
to the jury, in a manner not calculated to mislead
them, it will afford no ground for reversing the
judgment, 81 though some of its expressions, if
standing alone, might he regarded as erroneous,
or because some of them, taken abstractly, may
have been erroneous.' Anderson v. Mining Co.,
16 Utah 38, 50 Pac. 815; State v. McCoy, 15 Utah
141, 49 Pac. 420; Re~ese v. Mining Co., 17 Utah
··
496, 54 Pac. 759."
See also State v. McCoy, 15 Utah 141, 49 Pac. 420.
In Morgan v. Mammoth Mining Co., 26 Utah 174,
72 Pac. 688, the court said the fact that one paragraph
abstractly considered does not state the law with absolute precision does not constitute reversible error.
40
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In Daris v. Heiner. 5± Utah 428, 1~1 Pae. 587, it
\ra~ held that the case "~ould not be rever~ed for technical fla.,vs or particular form of instruetion8 'vithin the
discretion of the trial judge. See also Bergntan P. Den're.r & R. G. l'V. R. Co .. 53 Utah 213, 178 Pae. 68; l\1eMaster v. Salt La.ke Tr,nnsport.ati.on, 108 Utah 207, 159
Pac. (2d) 121; Brooks r. [Ttah Hotel Conrpany_, 108 Utah
220, 159 Pac. (2d) 127; and S;nith r. Coluntbus Buggy
Com pa.ny, ±0 Utah 580, 123 Pac. 580.
The issues of negligence and contributory negligence
\vere fairly and impartially tried. The instructions taken
as a whole and viewed in the light of the several claims
of negligence and contributory negligence denied by
each opposing party and the several statutory provisions and common law duties involved, substantially and
fairly presented the issues. Counsel's complaints at
n1ost are of technical defects as to arrange1nents or form.
CONCLUSION

The evidence in this case establishes that defendant
did not run the Manning boy down as contended by appellant, and the dent in !t:he rear of the bicycle was not
oaused by the f.ront of defendant's oar. The physical facts
corroborated by testimony shows that when Bobbie
Barnett called to Bobbie Manning, the latter in his haste
to join his companions, suddenly turned without warning
across an entire lane of traffic and into defendant's car
before defendant could have time to avert a collision.
Defendant was not violating the rules of the road and
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he had no reason to anticipate that Robert Manning
would suddenly make such a dart across the street. The
physical facts justified a directed verdict in favor of
defendant and the verdict is more than sustained by
the evidence.
It is respectfully submitted that a re-trial is not
justified.
Respectfully submitted,

STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
E. F. BALDWIN, JR.
Attorneys forr Defendant and
Respondent
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